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This paper analyses the importance to the Latin American
countries of the main dispute resolution facilities and
conventions applicable to international trade and investment,
of which they are the inseparable complement. The
spectacular growth in the disputes which these facilities deal
with reflects the impact that international trade and
investment are now having on economic development.
Despite international progress, however, most of the
countries have yet to update their domestic legislation, so
that this remains a pending task. Accession to the conventions
referred to entails numerous responsibilities for both
governments and businesses in Latin America. These include
paying close attention to the decisions of the international
bodies that deal with disputes, and shaping public activities
and policies accordingly. Furthermore, to avoid the high cost
of the foreign consultancies which regularly advise Latin
American governments and companies on such disputes, the
countries should train specialists of their own in these areas.
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I
Introduction
As international trade and investment have become
leading agents of economic development, disputes in
these areas have burgeoned. Consequently, the workings
of public- and private-sector facilities for settling
international trade and financial disputes, chiefly
arbitration, have assumed particular importance.
In the Latin American countries, different factors
have contributed to this trade and investment growth,
which can be traced back to the macroeconomic reforms
of the 1980s. These reforms did away with old restrictions
on the free movement of goods and services and opened
up markets to international competition. One
consequence of the growth in transactions and in the
resultant disputes has been a need to resolve the latter
through fast, modern, efficient facilities that are
independent of any national jurisdiction. Such facilities
are now the inseparable complement of the institutions
governing international economic and financial
relationships. They operate alike for disputes between
private organizations, between States, and between the
latter and the former. A decisive factor in this
development has been the repeal by the Latin American
countries of legal restrictions that prevented States from
submitting to foreign or international jurisdictions. This
change has also been contributed to by policies in the
industrialized countries restricting the immunities of
jurisdiction and enforcement enjoyed by States and
foreign public-sector enterprises in their commercial
activities. In parallel, these same countries have supported
bilateral agreements for the promotion and protection
of investments (APPI) establishing that disputes between
one State’s investors and another Contracting State will
be resolved through international arbitration. Anthony
Giddens, author of The Third Way: The Renewal of Social
Democracy, made an important point in an interview1
when he argued that the importance of globalization lay
in its effect not only on the development of markets, but
also and mainly on the way it transformed institutions
and contributed to the gradual breakdown of traditional
ideas of sovereignty.
II
The benefits for Latin America
Although quite belatedly, as will be seen, the countries
of Latin America have signed up to the main
international trade and investment dispute settlement
agreements.
While there are still problems, which will be
discussed later, acceptance of international jurisdiction
over such disputes is the third pillar of the structural
reforms initiated in recent decades. To put it another
way, the benefits of opening up to international trade
and investment would not have materialized had the
countries of Latin America insisted on submitting
disputes arising from such transactions to the exclusive
jurisdiction of their local courts.
By signing up to these agreements, they have
benefited in many ways.
From the point of view of international agents, the
knowledge that such disputes as may arise will be
resolved by facilities independent of the local
authorities is a decisive factor for those trading with or
investing in the region, and is taken into account in
their risk analyses. If such disputes are subject to the
jurisdiction of local courts, uncertainty as to the duration
and outcome and doubts about neutrality represent an
extra cost that discourages international trade and
investment. Conversely, acceptance of the main
international jurisdictions encourages such trade and
investment.
From the Latin American point of view, access to
international jurisdictions, be they private, like the
arbitration centres discussed further on, or public, like
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank
1
 El Mercurio (2000), p. E4.
99C E P A L  R E V I E W  8 0  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 3
RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT DISPUTES  •  GONZALO BIGGS
International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), APPI or free trade agreements, has also
had very positive consequences.
As Latin American exports have had a greater
impact on international trade, so too have further
obstacles and restrictions of all kinds been placed in
their way by competitors. Thus, our exports have
continually been beset by accusations (generally
unjustified) of unfair trade practices, polluting
processes, dumping and subsidization. Until recently,
efforts to rebut such accusations could only be made
before the administrative or legal authorities of the
importing countries, with disappointing results. The
high cost and lack of independence of these bodies often
meant that complaints were not pursued. Since special
procedures for settling trade disputes were created under
the auspices of WTO and free trade agreements,
circumstances have changed radically. Instead of
approaching the authorities of the importing country,
Latin American exporters can now defend themselves,
at small cost, before the dispute settlement bodies of
WTO or the free trade agreement concerned. It is also
safe to assume that the need to bring such accusations
will be reduced by the mere fact that these options exist.
Something similar has happened with investment
disputes which, as is well known, have given rise to the
worst international conflicts ever seen in our region.
Accession (albeit delayed) to the World Bank ICSID and
the inclusion in free trade agreements of procedures
for resolving such disputes in a non-confrontational
fashion have dispelled old suspicions and helped
increase foreign investment. A further consequence, and
one which is perhaps not yet well understood by
governments, is the need to harmonize national
investment policies and measures with the rules and
jurisprudence of these arbitration centres.
For all the progress made internationally, there
remains the paradox that the countries have not yet
updated their domestic legislation. The result is that,
with the exception of Mexico and perhaps Peru, no
Latin American country qualifies as a location for
international commercial arbitration. The impossibility
of keeping arbitral operations detached from the strict
controls and procedures of national codes, many of
them dating from the nineteenth century, means that
international centres for commercial arbitration cannot
function normally in the region.
In 1993, the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) began financing a very timely programme of
reform and modernization of its member countries’ legal
systems. As part of this, US$ 20 million of funding
was approved in 1994 for a programme of alternative
methods of dispute settlement, as a result of which it
was possible to create national mediation and arbitration
centres in 18 countries. Helpful as this programme has
been, there remains the need to modernize arbitration
legislation so that international trade disputes can be
resolved within the region.
In this paper we shall mention the main public-
and private-sector settlement facilities for international
trade and financial disputes, with particular reference
to the Latin American countries. Public-sector facilities
include the ones created at the initiative of international
organizations such as the United Nations, the
Organization of American States (OAS) and the World
Bank, and those deriving from international treaties and
conventions. Examples of these latter include the
facilities established by the conventions of The Hague
in 1907,2  Washington in 19653  and Panama in 1975,4
by free trade agreements, and by the Marrakesh
Ministerial Agreement of 1994 establishing WTO. All
these will be referred to later.
2
 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes.
3
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States.
4
 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial
Arbitration
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III
Latin America and international arbitration
Beginning in the eighteenth century, the European
countries, and subsequently the United States, applied
the doctrine of diplomatic protection in countries they
deemed “uncivilized”. This was developed by Vattel in
the eighteenth century and invoked to justify
intervention by one State in the internal affairs of
another, the argument being that an injury done to the
citizen of a State constituted an affront to that State
(Vattel, 1820, vol. 2, sec. 342, pp. 349 and 350). It was
incorporated into the international policy of Europe and
the United States and served to justify a number of
interventions in Latin America.
Latin America reacted to these foreign interventions
with the doctrines of Calvo and Drago. The Calvo
doctrine, developed from 1873 onward, argued that States
had exclusive jurisdiction over the behaviour of
foreigners within their borders; the Drago doctrine
rejected the use of force to collect the debts of States.5
Mexico was the first country to apply the Calvo
doctrine, beginning in 1873.6  It rapidly became a
generally accepted principle in Latin America and was
incorporated into the constitutions and legislation of
almost all the countries. Negative international
experiences justified the Calvo doctrine and fuelled an
attitude of hostility towards international arbitration.
Examples include the arbitration finding that justified
the military occupation of the Venezuelan ports for the
purpose of collecting loans made by different European
countries, and the Guiana ruling between Venezuela
and Great Britain, which came down entirely on the
side of the latter.7
The inclusion of non-intervention principles in the
charters of the United Nations and OAS meant that
diplomatic protection could not legally be invoked.
However, the industrialized countries continued to
reject the Calvo doctrine, especially when it came to
the expropriation of investments. To resolve this
difficulty, in 1964 the World Bank proposed the creation
of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). Its main objective was to remove
foreign investment-related conflicts from local
jurisdiction and prevent them from turning into conflicts
between States. To achieve this, ICSID applied two basic
principles. The first was the replacement of national
jurisdiction (in the State that had received the
investment) by international arbitration. The second was
the rejection of diplomatic protection.8
To encourage the Latin American countries to sign
up to ICSID, subrogation of an investor by that investor’s
State of origin was forbidden.9  This did not prevent
Latin America from collectively withholding its support,
however.10
An equally negative attitude towards international
arbitration was displayed in 1970 by Ruling 24 of the
Commission of the Cartagena Board, which made it
impermissible for investment contracts to include
provisions abrogating possible conflicts between
national jurisdictions.11  A similar principle was
reiterated in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States approved by the United Nations General
Assembly in 1974.12
These positions gradually shifted, however, and now
most of the countries accept international commercial
arbitration. This process began with accession, albeit much
delayed, to the New York Convention of 1958. It continued
with the Panama Convention of 1975 and with acceptance
by debtor States during the 1970s of foreign jurisdiction
to resolve disputes arising from lending by international
commercial banks. It culminated with agreements for the
promotion and protection of investments (APPI) and the
accession of most of the region’s countries to ICSID, the
exceptions being Mexico and Brazil.
5
 The Drago doctrine was an initiative of the Argentine Minister of
Foreign Relations, Luis María Drago (see Conil, 1975, p. 4).
6
 See note of 13 November 1873 from José María Lafragua,
Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, to John W. Foster of the
United States Legation in Mexico (Lafragua, 1873).
7
 It subsequently came to light that the ruling had been influenced
by a bribe paid to one of the arbitrators.
8
 Article 27 (1) of ICSID.
9
 See Szasz (1971).
10
 See declaration of the Chilean delegate, Félix Ruiz, on behalf of
the Latin American countries (Ruiz, 1964).
11
 Article 51 of Ruling 24, December 1970, of the Commission of the
Board of the Cartagena Agreement, which approved the Foreign Investor
Statute. The members of the Board are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
Peru and Venezuela. Chile is not a member now, but was in 1970.
12
 See Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of the United Nations General
Assembly, 12 December 1974.
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IV
The Permanent Court of Arbitration
Institutional arbitration was born at the first
International Peace Conference (The Hague, 1899),
which adopted the first Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes and established the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).13  This
Conference was continued by the second Peace
Conference at The Hague in 1907, which recognized
arbitration as the most effective way of resolving
problems of law or interpretation arising from
international treaties. The 1899 Convention was
replaced by that of 1907.
The PCA is the oldest arbitration body in the world,
and is still fully operational. Its jurisdiction is
extraordinarily wide and it may embrace any dispute
or only disputes of a certain category.14  It is not a court
but a facility whereby disputes are settled by arbitrators
appointed case by case, in accordance with a procedure
administered by its International Secretariat. It was the
precursor of the Permanent Court of International
Justice, dating from 1919, and it was particularly
important in its early years.
It was reinvigorated in 1981 when it was designated
by the United States and Iran to resolve their numerous
disputes. From then until January 2001, tribunals formed
in this way made 680 arbitral awards and set important
precedents for international contracts and compensation
for expropriation involving, among others,15  countries
in Latin America.16  One of the best known, and most
regrettable, legitimized the blockade of Venezuela’s ports
by three European countries to obtain payment of their
loans out of the country’s customs revenues. This ruling
led to the Drago doctrine already mentioned and
discredited international arbitration in Latin America.
Although it initially covered only disputes between
States, its jurisdiction has since extended to disputes
between States or international organizations and
private bodies. In 2002, 97 States were members of
PCA, including most of the Latin American ones.
V
The New York Convention of 1958
Another milestone in the development of international
commercial arbitration was the 1958 New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, to which 120 States were
signatories as of 2002. It was approved by the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial
Arbitration17  called by the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations.18  However, the Latin American
countries, which retained an open hostility towards
international arbitration, were the last to ratify it.19
The fortieth anniversary of the New York
Convention was celebrated on 10 June 1998, and the
Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan,
pointed out that this Agreement, which had been
subscribed to by 117 States, including the main
trading nations, was one of the most successful
treaties in the area of commercial law (United
Nations,  1999).  In fact –we might add– the
development of international commercial arbitration
began with this Convention, which originated in 1953
with a draft presented by the Paris International
13
 See Rosenne, ed. (2001).
14




 These cases have included Mexico and the United States (Pio
Fund in California) in 1902, Venezuela in 1902 and 1910, Peru in
1910 and 1914 and Costa Rica in 1998. This last case related to a
financing contract with Italy.
17
 Held in New York from 20 March to 10 June 1958.
18
 Resolution 604 (XXI) of the Economic and Social Council of
the United Nations, 3 May 1956.
19
 The first was Ecuador, in 1962, and the last Brazil, on 7 June
2002. Mexico ratified in 1971, Chile in 1975, Colombia in 1979,
Peru in 1988, Argentina in 1989 and Venezuela in 1995.
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Chamber of Commerce (ICC) to the Economic and
Social Council on international arbitral awards.
However, the Council limited it to foreign arbitral
awards.20  The proposal corrected the manifest
shortcomings of the 1927 Geneva Convention on the
Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which no Latin
American country had signed. An earlier instrument,
the 1923 Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses,
had not found acceptance in the Latin America region
either.21  The New York Convention rendered both
the Geneva Convention and the Geneva Protocol
inoperative.22
The New York Convention applies “to the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made
in the territory of a State other than the State where the
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought,
and arising out of differences between persons, whether
physical or legal”,23  and awards may be made by
arbitrators appointed for each case or by permanent
arbitral bodies.
The new features of the New York Convention in
relation to the Geneva Convention of 1927 were: i) it
did away with the double exequatur or judicial approval
of arbitral awards by the country where the award was
made and the country where enforcement was sought
(only the latter authorization was retained); ii) it reduced
the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement
of foreign arbitral awards, and iii) it inverted the burden
of proof on the party seeking recognition. Instead, it
established that grounds for denying recognition and
enforcement of an award could only be provided by
the party against which it was made.24  (Under the
Geneva Convention, the party seeking recognition had
to justify it). For all the contribution it has made to the
development of international commercial arbitration,
the lack of an institutional structure has undermined
the effectiveness of the Convention.
VI
The contribution of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
When it created UNCITRAL in 1966, the General
Assembly of the United Nations recognized that
“divergencies arising from the laws of different States
in matters relating to international trade constitute one
of the obstacles to development of world trade” and
expressed the view that, with this Commission, the
United Nations could play “a more active role towards
reducing or removing legal obstacles to the flow of
international trade”.25
UNCITRAL was given a mandate to promote the
“progressive harmonization” of the “law of
international trade”, and over the years it has become
the main United Nations legal institution for developing
international commercial law.
It consists of 36 member States elected by the
General Assembly for periods of six years, representing
the world’s different geographical regions and legal and
economic systems.26  It is based in Vienna and has
approved, among other things, the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules (1976) and the Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (1985).
1. The 1976 Arbitration Rules
These Arbitration Rules27  were approved after
consultation with governments and international
20
 The distinction between a foreign arbitral award and an
international arbitral award is a de facto question that the courts
have resolved case by case.
21
 Brazil signed the 1923 Protocol, but did not ratify it.
22
 Article 7 (2) of the New York Convention.
23
 Article 1 (1) of the Convention.
24
 Some countries entered reserves when ratifying the Convention.
The United States, for example, gave notice that it would apply the
Convention on a reciprocal basis and only to disputes deemed
commercial under United States law.
25
 General Assembly resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966,
fifth and ninth points.
26
 As of 2002, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico and
Paraguay were UNCITRAL members.
27 Approved by United Nations General Assembly resolution
31/98 of 15 December 1976.
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arbitration centres. They serve as a reference in
commercial contracts and are applied virtually
unaltered in ad hoc and institutional arbitration
proceedings and by the main arbitration centres.28
They are applied so universally because they were
drafted with the most diverse legal, social and economic
systems in mind. Confirmation of this universal acceptance
was provided by the agreement between the United States
and the Islamic Republic of Iran to use them to resolve
disputes between the two countries (Sekolec, 1987). The
Rules confirm the independence and autonomy of
arbitration proceedings insofar as they exclude any
obligation to conform to non-binding legal provisions
applicable to such proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may
conduct the arbitration in such manner as it considers
appropriate, provided that the parties are treated with
equality and that at any stage of the proceedings each party
is given a full opportunity of presenting his case.29
2. The 1985 Model Law
This was the outcome of intensive work and
consultation with institutions, governments and
experts in the different regions of the world. The
resolution approving it included the recommendation
“that all States give due consideration to the Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration, in view
of the desirability of uniformity of the law of arbitral
procedures and the specific needs of international
commercial arbitration practice”.30  It supplements the
New York Convention of 1958 and the 1976
Arbitration Rules. The latter depend on the binding
legal regime within which they are applied. The New
York Convention regulates enforcement procedures
but does not refer to the substance of arbitration. The
Model Law makes the Convention and Rules
operative, and is thus the third point in the legal
triangle regulating international commercial
arbitration.
The need to adopt the Model Law arose out of the
obstacles that national laws placed, and continue to
place, in the way of independent arbitration
proceedings.31  With few exceptions, however, the Latin
American countries have not yet brought their
legislation into line with the Model Law.
VII
The Inter-American Convention
on International Commercial Arbitration
On 30 January 1975, the Inter-American Conference
on Private International Law approved this Convention,
also known as the Panama Convention. Just as the New
York Convention dynamized commercial arbitration in
the world, the Panama Convention has tried to do the
same on the American continent.
1. Historical background
Ten years before the first International Peace
Conference (The Hague, 1899), the countries of Latin
America approved the 1889 Montevideo Treaty, which
included arbitration provisions. It was ratified by only
six countries, however, and was not widely applied
(OAS, 1980a). Later, the Bustamante Code of 1928 also
included arbitration provisions,32  as did the Montevideo
Convention of 1940 (OAS, 1980b). Once again, though,
the effects were few.
In 1934, however, the Seventh Conference of
American States created the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC), which
is still fully operational.33  IACAC was conceived as an
organ of the Pan-American Union (now OAS), with the
28
 Institutions using the Arbitration Rules include, among others,
the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC), the Spanish
Arbitration Court, the London Court of International Arbitration
and the Arbitration Court of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
29
 Article 15 (1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
30
 United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/72 of 11
December 1985.
31
 See Sekolec, 1987, p. 150.
32
 The Bustamante Code on Private International Law was approved
by the Inter-American Conference (Havana, 20 February 1928).
33
 Resolution XLI, 23 December 1933, of the Seventh Conference
of American States in Montevideo.
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support of the American Arbitration Association (AAA),
and its main responsibility was to create an inter-
American arbitration system (Norberg, 1975).
In 1967, the Inter-American Juridical Committee
approved a draft convention and, on 6 August 1973,
the final version. With this version and the contributions
of different countries, the present Convention was
approved in Panama City in 1975 (Norberg, 1975,
pp. 280 and 281).
2. The Inter-American Commercial Arbitration
Commission (IACAC)
The objective of IACAC34  is to establish and maintain
an inter-American system of alternative settlement
methods for commercial conflicts (arbitration,
conciliation and other methods) and to spread this
system in member countries.
Its main office is at OAS headquarters in
Washington, but it has national sections in different
countries. Its functions include administering
international commercial arbitration proceedings and
acting as a mediator or conciliator when the parties have
so agreed. Its income derives, among other sources,
from the membership dues and ordinary and
extraordinary contributions of national sections and
associate members.
The national sections, which are designated by the
IACAC Executive Committee in accordance with the
procedures laid down in its statute, are responsible for
implementing its plans and programmes. They have to
be legal persons of recognized solvency whose
objectives coincide with those of IACAC. They are
usually chambers of commerce. Associate members
include trade, academic or research associations whose
objectives are to promote or disseminate settlement
methods for conflicts of a commercial nature.
The Council is the highest IACAC body and its
members are the organization’s main officials –the
president, the three vice-presidents, the director general,
the secretary and the treasurer– and the main or alternate
delegates from the national sections. The officials are
elected by the Council for renewable periods of two years.
3. The Panama Convention
The justification for the Panama Convention has been
questioned by some authors (Kearney, 1987, p. 736)
on the grounds that it merely replicates the New York
Convention. It did have particular importance, however,
in that for the first time in the Latin American region it
established an international system of commercial law
that transcended national legislation.
Its contributions were as follows:
i) It was the first time the Latin American countries
had collectively come out in favour of international
commercial arbitration. It is significant that the
Panama Convention was approved when the only
countries in the region to have acceded to the New
York Convention were Ecuador and Mexico, and
no country had joined the World Bank ICSID
(Norberg, 1975, p. 276).
ii) No less importantly, the Panama Convention
included not only the Latin American countries but
the United States as well. This internationalized
the system by making it necessary to harmonize
the civil law culture of Latin America with the
common law tradition of the United States.
iii) Unlike the New York Convention, which has no
institutional structure, the Panama Convention was
administered by IACAC.
iv) The Panama Convention resolved numerous
impediments in national laws. Some examples: in
half of all cases, national legislation did not
recognize arbitration of future disputes. In other
cases, it was forbidden for arbitrators to be foreign,
or for arbitration proceedings to be conducted
abroad or in a language other than Spanish. The
Convention did away with these restrictions.35  As
regards the rules of procedure to be applied (about
which there was an intense debate), it was
established that, in the absence of agreement to
the contrary, arbitration would follow IACAC
procedures.36  These procedures came into force
in 1978, reproducing the UNCITRAL Rules
discussed earlier. Thus was the regional system
integrated into the international regime.37
34
 The IACAC Statute dates from 1 November 1996.
35
 Argentina held out against the Panama Convention because it
regarded it as contrary to the national Constitution, and because
the country did not recognize the validity of arbitration proceedings
conducted abroad or by non-Argentine arbitrators (Norberg, 1975,
p. 283). Quite some time later, on 15 March 1991, Argentina did
sign the Convention, ratifying it on 1 March 1995.
36
 Article 3 of the Panama Convention.
37
 On 14 June 1980, the Inter-American Convention on
Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgements and Arbitral Awards
came into force. This Convention has been signed by all the OAS
member States other than the United States, Canada and the English-
speaking countries of the Caribbean. Where arbitral awards are
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VIII
Dispute settlement in free trade agreements
Until the 1988 Free Trade Agreement between
Canada and the United States,38  trade agreements
dealt exclusively with trade in goods or services.
This new agreement changed that. In addition to
regulating such trade, its 20 chapters established a
special administration and rules applicable to all
economic relations between the two countries,
including dispute settlement. Its structure has been
carried over into the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), Chile’s free trade agreement
with Canada, Chile’s free trade agreement with the
United States and other such agreements. It is also
sure to influence the future Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA).
IX
The North American Free Trade Agreement
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico, is
the main free trade agreement in the American
hemisphere.39
Rather than supranational institutions with a legal
personality, assets and separate, independent
administrations, this treaty operates with the direct
involvement of the Contracting Parties. The main body
is the Free Trade Commission (hereinafter “the
Commission”) formed by ministerial-level
representatives from the three member countries, or
designated by them. Unless decided otherwise, their
rulings are arrived at by consensus.
NAFTA establishes a general procedure and special
procedures for settling disputes. The general procedure
of Chapter 20 applies in disputes over the interpretation
or application of the Agreement or wherever a Party
considers that an actual or proposed measure of another
Party is or would be inconsistent with the obligations
of the Agreement or cause nullification or impairment
of the benefits that could reasonably be expected from
it.40  The special procedures apply to disputes over
investments (Chapter 11), financial services
(Chapter 14), antidumping and countervailing duty
(Chapter 19) and environmental and labour issues.41
Of these procedures, it is the one relating to investment
that has been most often applied.
The general rule is that only the Contracting Parties
can initiate the formation of an arbitral tribunal to settle
disputes concerning the Agreement. Investment disputes
are the exception, as they can be initiated by an investor
from any of the Parties. Furthermore, investors can
undertake the action on their own behalf or on behalf
of an enterprise of the other Party that is a juridical
person that the investor owns or controls directly or
indirectly.42  As regards the applicable law, the
Agreement stipulates that it (the Agreement) is to be
interpreted in accordance with its objectives and
international law. It does not state, therefore, that
tribunals must apply the national law of any of the
Parties. However, the Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation stipulates that the plaintiff may take action
on the grounds that it has experienced “a persistent
pattern of failure by that other Party to effectively
enforce its environmental law”.43  Concerning the
enforcement of arbitral awards, the Agreement laysconcerned, it applies to everything not covered by the Panama
Convention.
38
 The Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States
was signed in 1988 and came into force on 1 January 1989.
39
 It was signed on 17 December 1992 and came into force on 1
January 1994. Environmental Cooperation and Labour Cooperation
Agreements were signed in parallel.
40
 Article 2004 of NAFTA.
41
 The Agreements on Environmental Cooperation and Labour
Cooperation were signed in parallel with NAFTA.
42
 Article 1117 of NAFTA.
43
 Articles 22 and 23 of the Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation.
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down special rules in each case. In investment disputes,
each Party is obliged to provide for enforcement in its
territory, but in the event of non-enforcement the
investor may seek enforcement of an arbitration award
under ICSID, the New York Convention or the Panama
Convention, whether or not a direct request for
enforcement has been made to the Commission.44  In
other cases, the rules are more complex. Broadly
speaking, the winning party may suspend the
application to the losing party of benefits of equivalent
effect to the sums owing if the losing party refuses to
comply with the award.45
1. Investment disputes (Chapter 11)
This applies to disputes between any of the Contracting
Parties and an investor from another Party in the
situations it describes.46  It operates when an investor
from one of the three countries complains that the
government of the host country has not complied with
the obligations of the Agreement. In these cases,
investors may ask for their complaint to be resolved
under one of the following procedures:
— The World Bank ICSID
— The ICSID Additional Facility47
— The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.
Alternatively, the investor may approach the courts
of the country hosting the investment. One
characteristic of this mechanism is that final arbitral
awards are automatically enforceable in the national
courts of the host country.
As of 2002, there had been six cases brought under
Chapter 11 by investing companies from the United
States against Mexico and one against Canada. The
cases against Mexico were brought under the ICSID
Additional Facility. The case against Canada, on the
other hand, was brought under the UNCITRAL Rules.
Of the cases against Mexico, three have been settled
and three are pending.48  Some interpretations of these
rulings have broadened different concepts used in
international agreements in unprecedented terms. One
example of this is the refusal by a provincial Mexican
authority to grant a particular construction permit on
environmental grounds, something that an arbitration
ruling construed as “tantamount to expropriation”.49
2. Antidumping disputes (Chapter 19)
Article 1903 provides that a party may request that an
amendment of another party’s antidumping or
countervailing duty statute be referred to a binational
panel for a declaratory opinion as to whether or not the
amendment conforms to the relevant provisions of WTO
or NAFTA, or whether it has the effect of overturning a
prior decision of the panel.
Article 1904 concerns the final antidumping and
countervailing duty determinations of an importing
party, and the existence of prejudice, and stipulates that
these determinations may be reviewed by a binational
panel as an alternative to judicial review or appeal to
the competent national bodies in some of the three
countries. As a safeguard against faulty or mistaken
panel procedures, article 1904 provides for an
“extraordinary challenge procedure”. This gives the
right of appeal, in serious cases, to a committee of three
judges selected from individuals who have been
members of the federal courts of Mexico or the United
States or of the higher courts of Canada.
44
 Article 1136 of NAFTA.
45
 Article 2019 of NAFTA.
46
 See Alvarez (2000) for a full analysis of Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
47
 See section XV, subsection 3 below.
X
Private international arbitration centres
Private international arbitration centres have been
another factor in the expansion of arbitration, as their
importance has steadily grown. The modern trend is
towards arbitration by specialist institutions, rather than
special arbitration.
Institutional private arbitration is a predictable,
stand-alone facility administered without outside
intervention, which ensures that standard procedures
48
 The cases heard against Mexico and the dates of the respective
awards were: i) Robert Azinian, 1 November 1999; ii) Metalclad,
30 August 2000, and iii) Waste Management, 2 June 2000. The
cases pending are: i) Técnicas Medio Ambientales, filed on 28
August 2000; ii) Waste Management, filed on 30 April 2001, and
iii) Fireman’s Insurance, filed on 15 January 2002.
49
 Metalclad versus Mexico. See ICSID (2001).
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will be conducted by independent professionals and that
awards will not be challenged. When rulings are made
by the leading international centres, furthermore, the
prestige of the institution and the New York Convention
ensures that they will be promptly complied with in
the place of arbitration and the rest of the world. It
should be added that States and State enterprises can
be (and have been) plaintiffs or defendants at these
arbitration centres. Their advantages are speed, low cost,
the professional quality of arbitrators, confidentiality,
security of enforcement and the elimination of appeals
to local courts, assuming in this last case that the
country’s legislation allows the parties to agree freely
on the procedures that arbitration will follow.
The main centres are the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), the International Arbitration Court
of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the
London International Arbitration Court and the
Arbitration Court of the Stockholm Chamber of
Commerce.50  The International Federation of
Commercial Arbitration Institutions was founded in
1985 and now has a membership of 74 arbitral
organizations in 46 countries, while in 1999 the AAA
formed the Global Center for Dispute Resolution
Research, which brings together the different arbitration
institutions in the public and private sectors. Its
objective is research into international arbitration.
The following figures will give some idea of the
scale of institutional arbitration.
In 1966, the AAA received 13,000 conciliation and
arbitration cases. In 2001 the figure was 218,000, of
which 650 were international. The ICC, founded in 1923,
has had a similar experience. In a period of 12 years,
from 1979 to 1990, it received 3,500 cases, which is as
many as it had had in the first 55 years of its existence
(1923-1978).51  A similar trend has been seen at the
other international centres, particularly those in Asia,
such as Hong Kong and China. By contrast, the
International Court of Justice has settled no more than
100 cases in its 58 years of existence.
XI
The American Arbitration Association (AAA)
1. Description
The AAA is the world’s leading arbitral institution. It
was formed in 1926 by businessmen, lawyers, traders
and academics in the United States to circumvent the
risks and expense of a judicial system that was not
responsive to the needs of the industrial age. In 1992 it
received its millionth case, and each year more cases
are received than the year before. It is run by a board
whose members include representatives of leading
industrial and commercial concerns, law firms and
academic institutions in the United States. It has 35
offices in the United States, 53 cooperation agreements
with arbitral institutions in 39 countries, an Advisory
Council for Asia and another for Latin America.
The AAA applies UNCITRAL procedures, with some
differences depending on whether the arbitration
concerned is domestic or international or concerns
specific sectors such as construction, intellectual
property or others. The arbitrators are appointed from
existing rosters once they have met various
requirements, including attendance at specialization
courses held by the AAA.
In 1996 the International Centre for Dispute
Resolution was set up as a separate division of the
AAA. In 2001 the Centre handled 649 cases and
became the world’s leading institution for the
handling of international commercial arbitration.
These cases represented claims and counterclaims
totalling over US$ 10 billion, and 43% were over a
million dollars.  The cases resolved involved
arbitrators or parties from 63 countries, and the
average settlement time was under 10 months (AAA,
2002).
50
 There is also the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) which, while
administratively part of the International Bureau of WIPO, operates
independently. It was set up in 1994 and provides mediation and
arbitration services for the settlement of disputes among private
organizations. Its areas of specialization are intellectual property,
electronic commerce and Internet disputes.
51
 The ICC mainly deals with international arbitration, while the
AAA works with both domestic and international cases.
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XII
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
1. Description
The ICC is the world’s leading international commercial
organization. Its objective is to promote international
trade and investment. It was founded in 1919 and its
members are companies and commercial organizations
from over 130 countries. Through its national committees
it has access to governments for issues involving
international trade and investment. After the creation of
the United Nations, the ICC was granted highest-level
consultative status with the UN and its specialized
agencies.52  It currently maintains and coordinates
programmes with WTO and ICSID, among others.
The ICC is run by a Council of delegates from the
national committees which generally meets every two
years.
In 1923, the ICC established the Court of
International Arbitration (hereinafter “the Court”) as
an independent organization to act on behalf of its
partners. Since its creation, the Court has played a
leading role in the main initiatives to develop
international commercial arbitration. It has 112
members in 73 countries, and its responsibility is to
organize and supervise, with the support of a Secretariat
of 40 professionals, arbitrations carried out under its
Rules. Together with the AAA, it is the world’s leading
commercial arbitration centre.
The Court has handled over 11,000 cases since its
inception, and since 1999 more than 500 cases a year
have been admitted. In 2001 it received 566 applications
from 116 countries, and made 341 awards. Some 54%
of cases were for amounts in excess of a million
dollars.53  Cases involving litigants from Latin America
and the Caribbean made up 9.2% of the total in 2001.54
2. Arbitration
The current rules came into force on 1 January 1998
and have applied to arbitration proceedings initiated
since then.55  The Court does not resolve disputes itself;
its function is to see that the Rules are applied.
Its characteristics are as follows: i) the Court’s
direct administration responsibilities include
confirmation of arbitrators and prior review of awards
to check that they are properly grounded and formally
correct; ii) the flexibility and universality of the system
means that arbitration can be carried out anywhere in
the world.
The tribunal is governed by its Rules and applies
the laws agreed upon by the parties. In the absence of
agreement, it applies the laws it considers appropriate.
Once it has received the dossier, the tribunal drafts the
terms of reference (summarizing the claims and
counterclaims and defining the issues in dispute) and,
once these have been signed by the parties and
arbitrators, sends them to the Court for approval. Next,
the tribunal proceeds to hear and settle the case. Once
this procedure is complete, it has six months to make
the award, the draft of which first has to be approved
by the Court. The Court may alter the form of the award
and draw attention to any substantive issues. No award
can be made before the Court has done this. Arbitrators’
fees and administrative expenses are determined
exclusively by the Court.
Once the award has been notified by the Secretariat,
the parties have to comply with it without further
formalities, and it is understood that they have waived
any right of recourse. The Rules state that the award
may be subject (for 30 days after notification) only to







 The main countries involved were Brazil (28 litigants), Mexico
(26) and Argentina (16). 55
 See Griguera-Naon (1998).
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XIII
Differences between the arbitration procedures
of the AAA and the ICC Court of Arbitration
The procedures of the AAA and the ICC Court of
Arbitration have the following differences:
— In the AAA, the arbitrators are appointed by the
parties or, failing agreement, by the AAA, from
existing rosters; the Court, on the other hand, does
not have rosters of arbitrators, and in the absence
of agreement appointments are based on the
recommendations of its national committees;
— The Court supervises proceedings from beginning
to end, and requires the tribunal to deliver terms
of reference within two months of receiving a
case.56  This requirement helps identify the
substantive issues and means that a large proportion
of cases are resolved amicably during this period.
This procedure does not exist in the AAA, which
leaves the arbitrator free to take decisions and
conduct proceedings freely and without
interference or oversight.
— A draft of the award has to be reviewed and
approved by the Court, which may also comment
on its substantive aspects.57  The AAA does not carry
out such review.
— The procedures of the AAA, unlike those of the
Court, require preliminary hearings or pre-
arbitration conferences, especially for large and
complex cases.
— The main function of the Court is to resolve
international arbitration cases. The AAA, on the
other hand, concentrates on domestic cases. Only
in the last decade have international cases come
to account for a substantial proportion of its
work.
— Arbitrators are required to have attended training
courses before they can be included on AAA
rosters.  The Court does not have this
requirement.
XIV
Agreements for the promotion and protection
of investments (APPI)
APPI58  have helped popularize international arbitration
as the most expeditious instrument for settling
investment disputes. Their development has been so
spectacular that the total number of agreements signed
is not known with any certainty. In 2000, there were
believed to be from 1,400 to 1,800 (Parra, 2000),
covering 155 countries.59
The first APPI were inspired by the treaties of
friendship and freedom of trade and navigation of the
nineteenth century. The earliest is believed to have been
the one signed in 1959 between Germany and Pakistan.
It included clauses dealing with the resolution of
differences between the Contracting States, but not of
those between a national of one State and the other State
(Parra, 2000).
The contents of APPI have been influenced by ICSID
since the creation of the latter in 1965.60  APPI have thus
become fairly uniform and, by signing them,
Contracting States are generally agreeing to use
international arbitration to resolve any differences
between an investor and a Contracting State.
56
 Article 18 of the Court’s Arbitration Rules (“Rules of the Court”).
57
 Article 27 of the Rules of the Court.
58
 See Dolzer and Stevens (1995) on this subject.
59
 World Bank, www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm.
60
 In 1969, ICSID approved a Model Clause relating to the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes for Bilateral
Investment Agreements.
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Subsequently, when disputes arise, the existence of this
prior consent in the APPI can prevent a Contracting State
from raising any valid objection to the arbitration agreed
on.
APPI also designate an international arbitral
jurisdiction to settle disputes over their interpretation
or application, but not over substantive issues.
Another common provision waives diplomatic
protection for any dispute that a national of one of the
Contracting States and the other Contracting State have
agreed to submit to ICSID arbitration.61  The arbitration
facilities most commonly designated are ICSID and its
Additional Facility (which can be used by non-members
such as Canada and Mexico)62  and the Rules of UNCITRAL.
XV
The International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
1. Description
ICSID (hereinafter “the Centre”) was created by
international treaty on the initiative of the World Bank,
and its main office operates out of World Bank
headquarters.63
As of April 2002, there were 134 member
countries. The purpose of the Centre is to “provide
facilities for conciliation and arbitration of investment
disputes between Contracting States and nationals of
other Contracting States in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention”.64
It consists of an Administrative Council and a
Secretariat, and it maintains panels of conciliators and
arbitrators. The Council is composed of one
representative of each Contracting State, usually the
governor whom each State appoints to the World Bank
and who represents it ex officio at the Centre. The same
rule applies to alternates. The President of the World
Bank is chair of the Council ex officio, but has no vote.
The Council sets the conditions under which the
secretary general and the alternate secretaries general
work.
The Secretariat is staffed by a secretary general
and one or more alternate secretaries general, and by
Centre personnel. The secretary general is elected by a
two thirds majority of Council members, at the proposal
of the president, and serves for a renewable term of six
years.
The conciliators and arbitrators on the rosters are
qualified individuals who have to meet the requirements
set out in the Convention. Each Contracting State may
place four people on each roster; these individuals may
but need not be nationals of that State. In addition, the
chair may choose 10 people of different nationalities
for inclusion in each roster.
2. Arbitration
A State or a national of a Contracting State may initiate
arbitration65  by applying to the secretary general. Once
the application has been recorded and notified, a tribunal
is formed. This may consist of a single arbitrator or an
odd number of arbitrators appointed by agreement
between the parties. In the absence of agreement, the
tribunal will consist of three arbitrators of whom one
will be appointed by each party and the third (who will
chair the tribunal) by mutual agreement. If there is no
61
 APPI often make article 27 (1) of the ICSID Statute applicable.
This states that “No Contracting State shall give diplomatic
protection, or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute
which one of its nationals and another Contracting State shall have
consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under
this Convention, unless such other Contracting State shall have
failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered in such
dispute”.
62
 On 27 September 1978, the Administrative Council of ICSID
authorized the Secretariat to administer, at the request of interested
parties, certain procedures between States and nationals of other
States that were outside the scope of ICSID. The sphere within which
these procedures are administered is stipulated in the Rules of the
ICSID Additional Facility.
63
 The treaty was opened for signature by World Bank members on
18 March 1965 and came into force on 14 October 1966.
64
 Article 1 (2) of ICSID. 65 See Shihata and Parra (1999).
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such agreement, the president will appoint the third
arbitrator.
The tribunal resolves differences in accordance
with the legal rules agreed upon by the parties or, where
there is disagreement, applies the legislation of the State
that is a party to the dispute. Notwithstanding, the
parties may agree that the tribunal should resolve the
dispute ex aequo et bono. As regards procedures, the
tribunal must apply the provisions of the Arbitration
Rules, unless the parties agree otherwise.66
The decisions of the tribunal must be taken by
majority vote among all its members. Once the award
has been made it is binding upon all parties, and there
is no right of appeal or any recourse other than as set
forth in the Convention, which specifies only the rights
of clarification, review and annulment.67
All Contracting States must recognize the binding
nature of awards and are obliged to enforce the
monetary obligations they entail within their own
territory as though they were a definitive ruling handed
down by a court of the State concerned.
As of 1999, claims for monetary prejudice had
totalled an estimated US$ 5 billion, with a case average
of US$ 90 million. The sums awarded, however, ranged
from US$ 400,000 to US$ 30 million. In other words,
they were between 5% and 20% of the sums claimed
(Shihata and Parra, 1999, p. 337).
3. The Additional Facility
On 27 September 1978, the Administrative Council
authorized the Secretariat to administer, at the request
of the interested parties, certain procedures between
States and nationals of other States that were outside
the scope of the Convention. Accordingly, the rules of
the Additional Facility were approved. These apply to
investment disputes in which one of the parties is not a
Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State
of the Convention. This is the case with Brazil, Canada
and Mexico, which are not ICSID members.
4. The development of ICSID
After a slow start, the following events turned ICSID
into a major international arbitration centre:
i) The creation, in 1978, of the Additional Facility
already referred to;
ii) The gradual incorporation of the Latin American
countries, other than Mexico and Brazil;
iii) The development of APPI and the designation in
such agreements of ICSID or the Additional Facility
of ICSID to settle differences between national
investors from any of the Contracting States and
these States;
iv) The 1995 implementation of NAFTA, whose
Chapter 11 establishes that investment disputes will
be resolved by ICSID, the Additional Facility of
ICSID or the Rules of UNCITRAL, and
v) The lifting by the Commission of the Cartagena
Agreement of the ban on referring investment
disputes to a non-domestic jurisdiction.68
5. The Latin American presence
As already noted, the Latin American countries were
the last to join the Centre. The first of them was El
Salvador, in 1984. Other countries continued to join
during the 1990s, until only Brazil and Mexico were
left outside. The last to join was Uruguay, in September
2000.
Although they have been members for only a short
time, the Latin American countries have already
accounted for a large share of the cases handled by the
Centre or its Additional Mechanism, or pending before
them.
Thus, of the 113 cases recorded up to 2002, 30
have been lodged by foreign investors against Latin
American countries. With one exception, all have
originated from an APPI, and of the 45 cases pending,
17 are against countries in the region.69  Argentina, with
12 applications against it, is the country involved in
the largest number of cases. It is followed by Mexico,
with six cases under the Additional Facility and Chapter
11 of NAFTA.70
66
 The Arbitration Rules were approved by the ICSID Administrative
Council on 25 September 1967. They were amended on 26
September 1984.
67
 Article 52 of the Rules lists five grounds for seeking annulment
of an award.
68
 Article 34 of Decision 220 of the Commission of the Cartagena
Agreement, of 11 March 1987, establishes that each country may
determine in its own legislation what dispute resolution facility is




 See ICSID (2002) and www.worldbank.icsid.org. In all the cases
involving Latin American countries, the plaintiffs have been
industrialized country investors. The only exception might be
Lucchetti, a Chilean company that in 2002 requested arbitration of
its differences with the Government of Peru.
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XVI
The World Trade Organization (WTO)
1. Description
WTO replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) of 1947, and is now the institution that
guides the multilateral system of international trade. It
was created by the Marrakesh Ministerial Agreement
of 1994, which ended the Uruguay Round of GATT
negotiations and also approved some other important
agreements.71  Among these was the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes (hereinafter the “Understanding”). This in turn
established the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which
is administered by WTO72  and has rapidly become one
of its main agencies.
Unlike the other facilities analysed, WTO
procedures apply exclusively to commercial
disagreements between States. These procedures are
also characterized by their gradual approach, and are
expressly intended to be non-contentious.73  Thus, the
terms used are “difference” rather than “dispute”,
“special group” rather than “tribunal”, and “report” or
“recommendation” rather than “ruling” or “judgement”.
The functions of WTO are discharged by the
Ministerial Conference, which is empowered to resolve
all matters included in the Multilateral Trade
Agreements adopted at Marrakesh (hereinafter “the
Agreements”)74  if a member so requests.75  It is
composed of representatives of all member countries
and meets at least once every two years. In the intervals,
its functions are discharged by the General Council,
which also includes representatives of all member
countries. This meets whenever it deems appropriate,
establishes its procedural rules, approves those of the
different Committees and performs the functions of the
DSB.
At the meetings of the Ministerial Conference and
the General Council, and at those of the DSB, each
member country has a vote and decisions are taken by
consensus.76  The Ministerial Conference appoints the
director general and specifies his or her powers and
responsibilities. The director general runs the Secretariat
and appoints its staff.
2. Procedures
The DSB has overcome the inadequacies of the GATT
system and successfully coped with the increase in
international commercial claims. From 1995 to October
2002, 268 cases were presented, and in over a fifth of
these the parties reached agreement through
consultation or similar measures.
The new procedure is characterized by a faster and
more automatic approach to panel selection and by the
creation of a permanent Appellate Body.77  It is also an
integrated system that allows countries to bring up
disputes relating to WTO and the Multilateral Trade
Agreements already referred to. This makes it possible
for the DSB to exercise its authority over the General
Council of WTO and also over the Councils and
Committees of the Agreements referred to.
The objective of the procedure is not to hand down
rulings but to resolve differences between the parties.
For this reason, priority is given to consultation,
mediation and conciliation, which can take place at any
stage of the procedure. The automatic character of the
procedure is reflected in the fact that once it has been
71
 The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted
by GATT began in 1984 and concluded with the Final Act of
Marrakesh in 1994.
72
 Article III (3) of the Marrakesh Agreement.
73
 Article 3 (10) of the agreement entitled Understanding, which
appears as Annex 2 of the Marrakesh Agreement. See WTO (1999).
74
 These agreements are an integral part of the Marrakesh Agreement
and are: i) the Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods; ii) the
General Agreement on Trade in Services; iii) the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; iv) the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, and v) the Trade Policy Review Mechanism. The
Plurilateral Trade Agreements, on the other hand, form part of the
Marrakesh Agreement only in respect of those members that have
accepted them.
75
 Article IV (1) of the Marrakesh Agreement.
76
 According to article 2 (4) of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, the DSB is deemed
to have taken a decision by consensus “if no Member, present at
the meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects
to the proposed decision”.
77
 Composed of seven people of recognized authority unaffiliated
with any government. They are appointed by the DSB for terms of
four years and three are involved in each case on a rota system.
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initiated by one party, its jurisdiction is binding on the
party against which it is directed, merely by virtue of
that party being a WTO member.
In contrast to GATT, the DSB procedure is
predictable and defined. Under GATT, rulings had to be
made by consensus and there was no deadline.
Opposition from one country was enough to block a
ruling. With WTO, on the other hand, the opposite
applies: decisions are deemed to have been approved
unless there is a consensus for rejection. Furthermore,
proceedings are clearly defined. Unless the parties agree
otherwise, they cannot last longer than a year, if there
is no appeal, or 15 months, if there is. In the case of
perishable objects, the procedure may last no longer
than three months.
The procedure has the following four stages: i)
consultation; ii) if no agreement is reached, the dispute
is resolved by a special group or panel, usually of three
members; iii) either of the parties may appeal to the
Appellate Body on issues of law in the panel report or
ruling; and iv) execution and enforcement of Appellate
Body rulings.
Panels are composed of well qualified individuals
who may be government officials, but may not be
nationals of the countries whose governments are
parties to the dispute or third parties, unless the parties
agree otherwise. To facilitate the choice, the Secretariat
maintains an indicative list of eligible people. Members
may periodically suggest names for this indicative list.
Panels have three members, unless the parties agree to
increase the number to five. The Secretariat proposes
candidates, and these may be opposed only for
“compelling reasons”.78
The Appellate Body can confirm, amend or revoke
the legal findings and conclusions of the report. Its
recommendations are adopted by the DSB and accepted
unconditionally by the parties to the dispute, unless the
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report within
30 days of this being distributed to members.
When the recommendations of the special group
or Appellate Body conclude that a measure is
incompatible with one of the Agreements, the member
affected must review that measure and advise, within a
reasonable time, how it proposes to apply the
recommendations of the DSB, under the latter’s
supervision. In the event of disagreement, this will be
resolved as soon as possible by the special group that
originally dealt with the matter.
If the recommendations are not applied, a special
procedure allows the member concerned to be asked
for some mutually acceptable temporary compensation.
If this compensation is not agreed within 20 days, the
other party can ask the DSB for authorization to suspend
concessions or other obligations under the agreements
to a level equivalent to nullification or impairment.79
If the member concerned challenges the level of
suspension proposed or the procedure followed, the
matter is submitted to the arbitration of the special group
which dealt with it, if available, or of an arbitrator
appointed by the Director General. In any case, the
suspension of concessions or other obligations is
temporary and applies only until the measure declared
incompatible with the covered agreement has been
reversed, or the member country offers to resolve the




Access to the main dispute resolution facilities analysed
and described in this paper entails major responsibilities
for Latin American governments and companies. They
need to keep themselves constantly informed of the rulings
and procedures of the relevant international bodies, and
to train professionals to participate in the cases that come
up, thereby avoiding the high cost of foreign advisors.
Another priority should be modernization of national
legislation to make it possible for international commercial
arbitration to be carried out in the countries of the region
rather than in another hemisphere, which is what has been
happening up to now.
78
 Article 8 (6) of the Understanding.
79
 Article 22 (3) of the Understanding lays down the following
order for suspension of concessions or other obligations by the
complainant: i) those in the same sector as that in which a violation
has been found; ii) if this is not practicable, those in other sectors
under the same agreement; and iii) if the circumstances are serious
enough, those under another covered agreement.
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